I. Introduction
On September 11, 2001 the U.S. was attacked when planes were hijacked and flown into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Nearly 3,000 Americans were killed, most of who were civilians. 2 Although members of the terrorist group al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks and the U.S. believed them, 3 the brutality and suddenness of the attacks left the U.S.
scrambling.
A month later the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which was designed to destroy the presence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. At that time, the Taliban -the un-recognized, illegitimate drug lords -were the de facto rulers of Afghanistan. Thus, the initial question was could the U.S. also fight and kill the Taliban Osama bin Laden. 5 In the wake of bin Laden's death, President Obama announced that America would begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. 6 The plan calls for approximately 30,000 troops to return to America by the end of 2012.
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The President announced this great troop reduction as a direct result of bin Laden's death.
Apparently, since al Qaeda's leader has been killed in Pakistan, America can reduce it's fighting of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This nonsensical logic and decision making highlights one of the fundamental problems with the legality of America's continued war in Afghanistan.
Since 1949 the United Nations Charter has provided the legal guidelines in the regulation of the use of force in international law. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, member states are prohibited from any use of force that threatens the territorial integrity of political independence of any state. This broad threshold against the use of force has three main exceptions. A state may resort to force in self-defense, pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution, or with the consent from the leader of the host state. At various times throughout the war, America has claimed its use of force in Afghanistan falls under all three exceptions, and as such all three will be examined here.
The most relatable justification to the general public would appear to be self-defense.
There is little doubt America was attacked on 9/11 and the perpetrators were members of al Qaeda. But Bin Laden's death and the subsequent troop withdrawal raise some concerns about the viability of self-defense as a legal justification for the war in Afghanistan. If America begins withdrawing from Afghanistan because the leader of al Qaeda was shot and killed in Pakistan, how was (and is) the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan self-defense against al Qaeda?
This Article will also examine why the other two potential international law exceptions that would allow for this type of military force do not apply. Outside of self-defense, states can use military force pursuant to a UN Security Council Resolution. However, there is no UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Afghanistan. The third exception for the use of force is consent. This Article will focus on the consent issue in Afghanistan, and, more specifically, the requisite legitimacy of a leader necessary to satisfy the consent requirement resulting in a legal use of force. Traditionally, this determination occurs at the outset of the hostilities, but it can also apply in an ongoing context where force is greatly escalated, such as the American situation in Afghanistan over the past decade. Here, Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai lacks authority and control over large parts of Afghanistan.
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The issue is whether someone who does not have control over a nation, and never did, authorizes another country to make war in that nation for more than a decade. After exploring these exceptions in regard to America's escalation of military force and promised continued military involvement in Afghanistan until years after bin Laden's death, the conclusion is that America's behavior is most likely illegal under international law. The import of such of finding is great. America's persistence to fight an illegal war of this nature, a war not based on self-defense, or authorized by the UN, or by consent of a legitimate leader, establishes a dangerous precedent. State A could prop up a leader in a country B, one who has no authority outside of the support from State A, and then State A could proceed to invade and fight a war for more than a decade based on that leaders supposed authority. One does not have to look far to see the problematic nature of setting such a precedent, with countries like China and Iran growing in stature and importance. This paradigm for fighting terrorism is not one that will maintain international peace and security in the long term. Quite the opposite is true, as it will likely encourage states to make war in whatever country they desire, under the consent of a supposed leader they propped up there.
Furthermore, the increase in terrorism against the West by global and mobile radical jihadists has ensured that the prolonged conflict in Afghanistan is likely to arise with more frequency in the future. 9 As such, this problem is unlikely to dissipate in the near future, but rather will be an increasing phenomenon as states that desire to combat terrorism attempt to legitimize their actions by utilizing the consent doctrine. The consent doctrine will likely be the biggest lure for legitimacy because the other two main justifications for the use force are functionally more problematic. 19 See Cronin and Ludes, supra note 9, at 2. "There is evidence that al-Qaeda has evolved into a more decentralized, franchised organization, with less direct control over its cells but more connections with other groups and an increasing convergence of formerly distinct causes. " Id. fight is no longer against those who claimed responsibility for 9/11 (if it ever was). in which a U.S. vessel, the Caroline, was destroyed attempting to deliver goods to Canadian insurgents. 42 The British shot at the Caroline and set it on fire. Webster declared that Britain's actions did not constitute legal self-defense, which was only justified "if the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
Applying the historical definition of self-defense under international law to the U.S.
continued involvement in Afghanistan, one has a difficult time arguing that the military invasion is legal. This is particularly troubling because, from day one throughout the entire invasion, the U.S. has claimed self-defense. 44 Initially, the U.S. might have legitimately claimed the necessity was so overwhelming that it had to invade Afghanistan in October 2001, because more attacks by al Qaeda were promised, and many members of al Qaeda were suspected of hiding out in Afghanistan. 45 But it is now widely believed, including by Karzai himself, that al Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan.
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In light of this, America's December 2009 announcement of 30,000 more troops, more than eight years after the initial invasion, makes it untenable that America's current military presence falls under auspices of the Caroline Doctrine of self-defense. This is further exacerbated by the lack of any attack on the U.S. by al Qaeda since 9/11, much less by the Taliban or any terrorist from Afghanistan.
Since the mid 19th century, the Caroline Doctrine has been one basis for which states can rely upon self-defense as a use of force under international law. By the mid twentieth century, But it is not necessary to fully engage in the "armed attack" debate because here there was an armed attack on the U.S. precedent to America's military invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent claims of self-defense. Nevertheless, Jules Lobel's description of Art. 51 is instructive:
The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force except when authorised by the Security Council or when undertaken by individual nations in self-defence and in response to 'an armed attack.' Moreover, as a general matter, the United Nations has sought to limit the Article 51 self-defence exception to prevent its The analogy to Kuwait is interesting and will be explored in more detail below. But the most striking thing about this assessment is when it occurred -the summer of 2002. Since then, the U.S. has continued to bomb and kill thousands of Afghan civilians. 73 Is it still necessary to kill
Afghan civilians in a fight against the Taliban, when al Qaeda is the group that attacked America more than a decade ago?
There is also strong debate regarding the proportionality of the continuous attacks in Afghanistan. 74 International law defines proportionality "not in terms of the original aggression, 75 Second, because al Qaeda is united by an ideology, they have no specific territory (like Afghanistan) that can be taken to defeat them. Traditional warfare methods, such as those currently being utilized by the U.S. through Predator drone bombing and hand-to-hand combat, do not apply. "International terrorism is an enduring challenge that will not be 'defeated' as in a 'war.'" Cronin and Ludes, supra note 9, at 2. legality of [Operation] Enduring Freedom concerns whether the operation remained necessary and proportional to America's self-defense after the fall of the Taliban government." 84 The goals remain primarily the same -and they remain accomplished. 85 Is it really necessary to militarily defeat the Taliban, to keep America safe from the terrorists that were responsible for the September 11 attacks more than a decade ago? Notably, there are no claims in the international community that the Taliban are the "terrorists" directly responsible for 9/11.
Members of the Taliban have not declared a jihad against the U.S. or the West. To the contrary, the Taliban claims it simply wants the U.S. to leave:
We had and have no plan of harming countries of the world, including those in Europe ... our goal is the independence of the country and the building of an Islamic state. Still, if you (NATO and U.S. troops) want to colonize the country of proud and pious Afghans under the baseless pretext of a war on terror, then you should know that our patience will only increase and that we are ready for a long war.
86
Regardless of that statement's veracity, the Taliban is still primarily comprised of drug lords that are defending themselves against the onslaught of American troops. 87 Thus, despite claims to the contrary, America's military involvement is no longer a self-defense action against al Qaeda that comports with the concepts of necessity and proportionality under Art. 51. 88 unilaterally using force to overthrow the current government of Afghanistan, a country that never attacked it, the U.S. violated the first Principle of the Declaration. . The veracity of these new rules is in doubt, however, as evidenced by Alvarez's parade of qualifiers before articulating them: "Given the legislative efforts in at least one of those resolutions (1373) and the tendency for many of the Council's actions to be read as having broader normative effect, the prospective endorsement of individual and collective selfdefense by the Council, together with its later acquiescence in Operation Enduring Freedom, may signal, depending on how the Council's license comes to be interpreted by its licensee, the advent of three new general rules with respect to defensive force in the age of terrorism." Id. 103 In short, the Taliban has nothing left to harbor.
America also arguably violated Principle (c). The establishment of the Interim
Others disagree further, and maintain these Resolutions do not introduce a broader meaning of self-defense, even if directed only at terrorism. 104 According to Greg Maggs, the The situation in Afghanistan is somewhat unique, in that it can be argued that Afghanistan has some of the hallmarks of a failed sate. A failed state is a state that lacks a functioning political decision-making process and fails to exercise meaningful control over its borders or territory. 112 But at present there is no failed state doctrine in international law with respect to use of force. This is most likely the result of the inherent difficulties in promulgating such a doctrine. 113 However, a failed state designation, or lack thereof, is beside the point for the purposes of the use of force in Afghanistan. Regardless of whether a state is officially "failed" or not, characteristics of that state's leader can still be examined to determine whether he or she is authorized to allow a military invasion in his or her state. The difficulties of having a system that rests on a particular definition of a controversial term, such as failed state, are many.
As an analogy, regulating torture is a good example. The word torture is so difficult to define that any laws that prohibit the use of torture are subject to widely varying interpretation, no matter how extensive the definition. The resulting inconsistency has lead to widespread abuses worldwide.
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Thus, for the purposes of allowing a foreign military to make war in a state, the decision should not turn on whether that state has officially been classified as a failed state. America recognized early on that since al Qaeda was largely absent from Afghanistan, the legality of its war there was increasingly tenuous. As a result, the U.S. quickly decided to hold free and fair democratic elections in Afghanistan by 2004. This was not borne out of altruism or a strong desire to see the Afghan people have a free society. Rather, the U.S. needed a legitimate and legal reason to continue making war in Afghanistan, against a foe that never attacked it. America needed Karzai to get elected by the people, so his consent to the war could create at least the illusion of legitimacy for its continued invasion and active military presence in Afghanistan.
A) The 2004 Afghanistan Election
In 2004 the U.S. announced that Afghanistan was going to have a fair and democratic election. 158 The seemingly democratic system installed in Afghanistan by the Interim Authority called for an elected President of Afghanistan to serve a five-year term. 159 In order to avoid a run-off, the winner of the general election in Afghanistan also had to have more than 50% of the popular vote. 160 Thus, heading into the 2004 election America's primary focus was ensuring that
Hamid Karzai, received more than 50% of the vote -at all costs.
Those costs included an unfair democratic process. By all accounts "the 2004 election was rigged." 161 From the beginning, the U.S. made sure the message was out that Karzai was supposed to win, by ensuring that Karzai received "over 75% of all state and radio coverage" since campaigning began in late 2004. 162 On the state-controlled Afghan radio -a key medium in Afghanistan -Karzai received 85% of all the editorial coverage of candidates. 163 There was also no "check" on Afghanistan's state-controlled media, as in America's democracy. There was no Saturday Night Live television program making fun of the media-loving Barack Obama, or giving Sarah Palin a chance to defend herself and be funny. 164 How can there be a legitimate democratic election if the key tenets of democracy are disregarded in the electoral process?
More specifically, the 2004 election was marred by an indelible ink scandal that tainted the vote count. In an effort to prevent fraud and ensure an accurate vote count, the election polls for the 2004 Afghanistan Presidential election required each person to dip their finger in indelible ink as they cast their vote. 165 However, numerous Afghans, including at least two presidential candidates, complained that the ink used at the polling stations came off far too easily, thereby allowing one person to vote multiple times. 166 One presidential candidate Ramazan Badhardost, was so upset by the fungible nature of the ink that he urged the Independent Election Commission (IEC) to cancel the entire election. 167 Said Mr. Badhardost "This is not an election, this is a comedy." 168 It is upon that basis, a farce of an election under the veil of a fair democratic process, that the U.S. garnered authorization from an "elected leader" to increase its military involvement in
Afghanistan. The international community should be careful about accepting this as the model for compliance with international law. After the votes were counted, it only got worse. By October, UN backed fraud investigators threw out nearly a third of Karzai's votes, over one million total, because they were fraudulent. 177 That left Karzai short of the 50% majority he needed to win in Afghanistan and avoid a run-off against Abdullah. This represented the worst case scenario for America -proof that the elections were rigged and that Karzai was not the rightful, legitimate ruler of Afghanistan. However, these UN backed investigators were only there to report the findings -it was up to the IEC to announce the final results or commence with the run-off. 178 At the same time, Americans were dying every day in Afghanistan at an increasingly alarming rate. 179 American generals urged the Obama administration to send more troops, but the White House refused, claiming that "no decision on sending more troops to Afghanistan would be made before the election crisis is resolved." 180 211 See UNAMA, supra note 110. There are UN organizations established in 2001 that authorize the OEF and others to secure Kabul and other cities in Afghanistan to allow for peacekeeping and humanitarian and political assistance to take place. This is not the same, however, as Security Council authorization the to use any means necessary to fight the war on terror against the Taliban and anyone else it suspects might have assisted al Qaeda a decade ago. For example, neither the UNAMA nor the ISAF authorize the U.S. to fire predator drones into a crowd of a 1000 civilians in the hopes of killing 3 suspected al Qaeda or Taliban members. 212 Chandrasekaran, supra, note 201.
